[Starlingx-discuss] Recommended C/C++ compiler flag for security
MacDonald, Eric
Eric.MacDonald at windriver.com
Tue Jan 22 19:59:31 UTC 2019
Ada,
Regarding ....
>
> Yes, we executed several test cases covering what Ken mentions (manually). What I'm not sure is about
> heartbeat loss, but let me check.
> What we can do is to build a test plan and submit it for revision. When do you need it (and please, don't
> say tomorrow)?
>
What are you not sure about regarding heartbeat loss ? I assume testing and detection.
Suggest reboot an in-service (unlocked-enabled-available) node and see that there are heartbeat communication loss and inservice failure alarms, that the system detects and Gracefully Recovers the rebooted host and clears said alarms once the host recovers back in-service.
Eric.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cabrales, Ada [mailto:ada.cabrales at intel.com]
> Sent: Monday, January 21, 2019 4:51 PM
> To: Young, Ken; Victor Rodriguez
> Cc: starlingx-discuss at lists.starlingx.io
> Subject: Re: [Starlingx-discuss] Recommended C/C++ compiler flag for security
>
> Comments inline
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Young, Ken [mailto:Ken.Young at windriver.com]
> > Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 9:34 AM
> > To: Victor Rodriguez <vm.rod25 at gmail.com>
> > Cc: starlingx-discuss at lists.starlingx.io
> > Subject: Re: [Starlingx-discuss] Recommended C/C++ compiler flag for
> > security
> >
> > See inline.
> >
> > On 2019-01-17, 5:34 PM, "Victor Rodriguez" <vm.rod25 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 10:35 AM Young, Ken
> > <Ken.Young at windriver.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Victor,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Security work is never completed. There is always a long list of inventive
> > new vulnerabilities and a laundry list of hardening work to be completed.
> > The vulnerability work, considering the severity, is generally urgent.
> > Hardening work is not urgent but important. In this case, we are dealing with
> > a hardening initiative that focuses on a small area of the code.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The challenge is that these small change proposed have larger
> > implications. As was pointed out on the gerrit reviews, performance and / or
> > functional testing is required.
> >
> > Hi Ken
> >
> > Just to follow the idea of this mail after hollliday break, you mention that:
> >
> > My concern is that we affect the timing / behaviour of stx-ha and
> > stx-metal such that they do not work together in some scenarios. This
> > will need to be tested and is certainly larger than a sanity.
> >
> > Could you please help to describe n human words, ( I can do the script
> > ) how a good test to probe this would look like?
> > If you provide me with a basic description of the security test I
> > could help writing the first draft of a code test that help us to
> > prove if the flags break the functionality
> >
> > Victor,
> >
> > At a high level, we need to regress the behaviour of stx-ha and stx-metal to
> > ensure that there is functional issues introduced by the change to the
> > compiler. As well, we need to look at the system behaviour of ha and metal
> > to ensure no changes have been introduced which affect has behaviour:
> >
> > - SWACT detection and time
> > - Multinode failure avoidance
> > - Heartbeat loss
> > - lock / unlock
> > - etc
> >
> > I believe that Ada has the test for ha and metal. Please review.
> >
>
> Yes, we executed several test cases covering what Ken mentions (manually). What I'm not sure is about
> heartbeat loss, but let me check.
> What we can do is to build a test plan and submit it for revision. When do you need it (and please, don't
> say tomorrow)?
>
> Ada
>
> > Regards,
> > Ken Y
> >
> > thanks
> >
> > Victor R
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Also, I am wondering if there is a way to phase the effort. For example, is
> > there a way to break up the flag changes such that the warnings are
> > separated from the flags which change the compiled code? That way, we
> > are not trying to jam everything through at once.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Hope this helps. Happy to discuss when you return from Holliday.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > >
> > > Ken Y
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Victor Rodriguez <vm.rod25 at gmail.com>
> > > Date: Friday, December 28, 2018 at 7:34 PM
> > > To: Curtis <serverascode at gmail.com>
> > > Cc: "starlingx-discuss at lists.starlingx.io" <starlingx-
> > discuss at lists.starlingx.io>
> > > Subject: Re: [Starlingx-discuss] Recommended C/C++ compiler flag for
> > security
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Fri, Dec 21, 2018, 07:08 Curtis <serverascode at gmail.com wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:47 PM Victor Rodriguez
> > <vm.rod25 at gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi StarlingX community
> > >
> > > We can all agree that security is an important feature to be taken
> > > into consideration in any SW project. In the aim of improving the
> > > security of the StarlingX project, we have been taking the task to
> > > propose the use of some compiler flags that prevent and detect some
> > > security holes, especially by buffer overflow that could lead into ROP
> > > attacks.
> > >
> > > The list of flags that we are proposing are :
> > >
> > > Stack-based Buffer Overrun Detection: CFLAGS=”-fstack-protector-
> > strong”
> > >
> > > Fortify source: CFLAGS="-O2 -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
> > > Format string vulnerabilities: CFLAGS="-Wformat -Wformat-
> > security"
> > > Stack execution protection: LDFLAGS="-z noexecstack"
> > > Data relocation and protection (RELRO): LDLFAGS="-z relro -z now"
> > >
> > >
> > > These are being analyzed in the following Gerrit reviews (thanks a lot
> > > for all the good feedback)
> > >
> > > https://review.openstack.org/#/c/623608/
> > > https://review.openstack.org/#/c/623603/
> > > https://review.openstack.org/#/c/623601/
> > > https://review.openstack.org/#/c/623599/
> > >
> > > As requested in the Gerrit reviews, there is a proper need to first
> > > understand what these compiler flags do and what is the impact they
> > > have at the functional and performance area of the project. This is a
> > > preliminary report, we will be following up with a test plan for
> > > functional & performance test plans for the services as a next step.
> > > This report includes:
> > >
> > > * Detailed description of what the compiler flag does
> > > * Code example that shows how does it work to prevent attacks
> > > * If there is a change in the binary, we create a microbenchmark that
> > > shows us how the flag impact the performance
> > >
> > >
> > https://github.com/VictorRodriguez/hobbies/tree/master/c_programing_ex
> > ercises/cflags_security
> > >
> > > As a result of the microbenchmark, the performance impact is not
> > > relevant ( less than 1% ) using an Ubuntu x86 system ( GCC 5 ) (more
> > > details on the HW and SW specification upon requests)
> > >
> > > The areas of the code we are suggesting on the patches are:
> > >
> > > * stx-ha
> > > * stx-metal
> > > * stx-nfv
> > > * stx-fault
> > >
> > > We do take care that these flags are not breaking the following areas
> > > after being applied.
> > >
> > > * Build process of the image
> > > * Sanity test cases after the image is created
> > > (Ada can give more details on the sanity report of the image generated
> > > with these flags)
> > >
> > > If running the sanity tests are not enough to prove that a change in
> > > compiler flags do not affect functionality, please gave us the right
> > > path to follow.
> > >
> > > As mentioned before, this is a preliminary report, and that we will be
> > > following up with a test plan for functional & performance test plans
> > > for the services as a next step.
> > >
> > > Hope this email helps to clarify some questions related to the flags
> > > and start the follow-up discussion.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks for the context Victor, it's very helpful to me.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Curtis, glad it helps, it was fun to do the research
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > One thing I want to mention is something the Kata Containers team was
> > talking about at the Berlin OpenStack summit, which is when many small
> > performance hits start to add up. They have to be careful to ensure they
> > don't have a bunch of smallish looking changes that add up to a large
> > performance hit over a longer period of time.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > You are right, it's a valid point that we need to take care too
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Overall I'm sure the StarlingX project would like to have some
> > performance testing, if we don't already, though that can be challenging for
> > an open source project. I had mentioned OPNFV's Functest and related
> > projects on the TSC call, but now seeing which components are affected I'm
> > not sure that would be directly helpful. I look forward to further discussions
> > around this area.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks for let me know that, I will take a look at OPNFV's functest and
> > other projects before the next TSC of 2019
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I will do my best to came up with a proposal for a better performance
> > testing.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Victor Rodriguez
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > >
> > > Curtis
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Regards
> > >
> > > Victor Rodriguez
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Starlingx-discuss mailing list
> > > Starlingx-discuss at lists.starlingx.io
> > > http://lists.starlingx.io/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/starlingx-discuss
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> > > Blog: serverascode.com
> >
> >
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